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Abstract 
The paper extends work done on authoritarian populism (AP) in the UK to 11 other European 
countries: France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Poland, Italy, Spain, Romania, Lithuania, 
and Holland.  Representative sample surveys with a common set of questions were conducted in 
each of these countries and in the UK in November 2016.   The paper shows that authoritarian 
populist attitudes (anti-immigrant, anti-EU, anti-Human Rights and pro a robust foreign policy) form 
a single AP factor or scale in ten of the twelve countries surveyed (the two exceptions are Romania 
and Lithuania).  Across these ten countries the sources of AP attitudes are also very similar, with 
particularly strong effects being observed for the perceived cultural consequences of immigration.  
The paper uses cluster analysis to show that authoritarian populism is not an exclusively right-wing 
mindset among European mass publics. Analysis of voting data shows that the reservoir of support 
for authoritarian populist parties is much larger than either the current electoral strength of such 
parties or the proportion of the population that intends to vote for them at the next general election 
would suggest. 
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The election of Donald Trump in the US  and the rise of support for populist parties in Europe have 
prompted widespread journalistic and academic speculation about the character and strength of 
populist opinion across the western world.  Such opinion constitutes a reservoir of potential support 
for populist movements that seek to make electoral capital at the expense of established, 
‘mainstream’ political parties.  Recent research in the UK has shown that a cluster of attitudes that 
can reasonably be described as Authoritarian Populist – centring on opposition to immigration, 
cynicism about human rights, disapproval of the EU, support for a robust defence and foreign policy, 
and a right-wing ideology – form a single factor that underpins a range of other political preferences 
(Sanders, Scotto and Reifler, 2016).  This paper extends the work done on authoritarian populism 
(AP) in the UK to 11 other European countries: France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Poland, 
Italy, Spain, Romania, Lithuania, and Holland.  Representative sample surveys with a common set of 
questions were conducted in each of these countries and in the UK in November 2016.   
Part 1 of the paper presents a series of factor and scaling models that show that authoritarian 
populist attitudes form a single AP factor or scale in ten of the twelve countries surveyed (the two 
exceptions are Romania and Lithuania).  Part 2 shows that across these ten countries the sources of 
AP attitudes are also very similar, with particularly strong effects being observed for the perceived 
cultural consequences of immigration.  Part 3 relaxes the assumption that authoritarian populism is 
an exclusively right-wing mindset among European mass publics.  It conducts a series of country-by-
country cluster analyses based on the component measures of our authoritarian populist scale, 
which enable us to identify the main ‘political tribes’ in each of our twelve countries. They also allow 
us to differentiate between left-wing and right-wing authoritarian populists, and thus to estimate 
the respective sizes of the AP support reservoir in each of our sampled countries.  Part 4 presents 
the simple relationship between ‘political tribe’ membership and voting intention as indicated in our 
surveys.  The results show that the reservoir of support for authoritarian populist parties is much 
larger than either the current electoral strength of such parties or the proportion of the population 
that intends to vote for them at the next general election would suggest. 
1. Measuring Authoritarian Populist Opinion in 10 EU countries 
Representative sample surveys were conducted by internet in 12 EU countries in November 2016.  
Just over one thousand respondents were interviewed in each country, though the sample was 
slightly larger in the UK (N=1711).   A multiwave panel survey conducted between 2011 and 2015 
had provided evidence that in the UK there is a distinct constellation of attitudes UK that form a 
single scale which can best described as authoritarian populist.  In the surveys conducted in 
November 2016 we wished to establish the extent to which similar constellations might be observed 
in other European countries.   
Table 1 outlines the eight items we used to measure authoritarian populist dispositions.  These 
comprised: two indicators of attitudes towards immigration (the number of negative emotions 
associated with immigration and the belief that immigration from outside the EU is a bad thing); two 
indicators of anti-EU attitudes (disapproval of the EU and distrust of EU institutions); two indicators 
of respondents’ national orientations (the conviction that the respondent’s country should pursue a 
‘strong and tough foreign policy’ and the belief that patriotism is important); a single indicator of 
cynicism about Human Rights (agreement with the proposition that ‘People who talk about 
protecting human rights are mainly interested in protecting the rights of criminals, not those of their 
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victims’); and a single measure of ideological position (the respondent’s self-placement on an 11-
point left-right ideological scale).  The first seven rows of the table indicate the percentage of 
respondents who take an authoritarian populist position on each of the indicators shown.  Thus, for 
example, 63% of all respondents expressed at least one negative emotion about immigration to their 
respective countries, with the lowest level being reported in Spain (53%) and the highest in Poland 
(75%).  Similarly, 36% of all respondents expressed cynicism about Human Rights, with the lowest 
level being observed in Sweden (27%) and the highest in Lithuania and Romania (45%).  The final row 
of the table shows the mean score on a 0-10 left-right self-placement scale.  The mean across all 12 
countries is slightly right of centre (5.2), with Spanish respondents on average being the most left-
wing (mean score 4.4) and French respondents the most right-wing (5.5). 
Table 2 presents the results of a series of exploratory factor analyses and alpha-scaling models that 
test the proposition that the eight authoritarian populist indicators shown in Table 1 form a single 
factor or scale.  The results are reported for each country separately.  In each of the factor models, 
we expect all the component indicators to load relatively highly on the first factor (the only factor 
loadings reported) and that the eigenvalues of the first factor will be substantially larger than the 
equivalent value for the second factor (since such differences reflect the relative importance of the 
first factor).  In the alpha-scaling models, we expect alpha values either close to or greater than a=.7, 
since this is generally regarded as an indication that the measured items form a single scale.   
In ten of the twelve countries, the results broadly conform to this expected pattern.  In the UK, for 
example, all of the component variables load above .5 on the first factor and there is a very large 
difference between the eigenvalues of the first factor (3.55) and the second factor (0.16). The alpha 
scale coefficient in the UK model (0.84) is well above the 0.7 threshold.  The models produce 
similarly positive results in France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finand, Poland and the 
Netherlands.  In Italy and Spain, the model fits are less good, though still reasonably close to 
expectations.  In Italy, the position is complicated by the fact that ideological self-placement loads 
negatively on the first factor, suggesting that authoritarian populist attitudes in that country may be 
associated more with the political left than with the political right. In Spain, the negative coefficents 
on the two EU variables suggest that authoritarian populist attitudes tend to be associated with 
support for rather than disapproval of the EU.  Finally, in the Lithuania and Romania models, the 
models look very weak indeed.  Both factor models produce a series of very low loadings on the first 
factor, and the eigenvalues for the first factor are both below unity – an indication that the first 
factor explains relatively little of the overall variance in the component indicators. By the same 
token, the scaling models produce alpha coefficients well below the 0.7 threshold (0.37 for Romania; 
0.36 for Lithuania).  The final column of Table 2 reports the results of factor and alpha-scaling 
models conducted across the ten countries, excluding Lithuania and Romania.  These results strongly 
meet expectations: averaged across all ten countries, all the component indicators load positively on 
the first factor; the first factor eigenvalue significantly exceeds that for the second factor; and the 
alpha coefficient meets the a=0.7 threshold. 
The results reported in Table 2 clearly support the notion that in the majority of countries examined, 
there is a set of political attitudes that constitute a distinctive mindset, which we wish to 
characterise as authoritarian populist.  Although there are one or two anomalies that we return to in 
section 3 below, we would argue that this constellation of attitudes – anti-immigrant, anti-Human 
Rights, anti-EU, supportive of a strong nation state, and (generally) ideologically right-wing – 
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represents an important dimension of contemporary mass political thinking.  In the next section, we 
explore the individual- and system-level sources of this mindset.  In this exercise our purpose is 
twofold: (1) to validate our authoritarian populist scale measure by showing that it correlates more 
or less as predicted with variables that a priori theorising suggests should influence it; and (2) to 
provide a preliminary causal account of the origins of authoritarian populist attitudes. 
2. Exploring the sources of Authoritarian Populist attitudes in 10 EU countries 
There are innumberable hypotheses that could be posited to explain why individuals vary in their 
degree of commitment to authoritarian populist ideas.1  Here, we concentrate on a limited set of 
propositions that our (limited) data enable us to test across the 10 countries where AP attitudes, as 
shown in Table 2, clearly form a single scale.   
We explore seven sets of hypotheses.  The first relates to why so many people across Europe appear 
to be concerned about immigration.  One possible reason is that they believe immigration either has 
had or will have an adverse effect on the community in which they live, making it feel less like the 
‘home’ in which they grew up.  This belief does not necessarily reflect the objective size of the local 
or national immigrant community, but it can have important consequences for the development of 
an authoritarian populist mindset.  We operationalize this notion by assessing the extent to which 
individuals agree with the statement that ‘There are so many foreigners round here that it doesn’t 
feel like home any more’.  We hypothesise that agreement will be positively associated with AP 
attitudes regardless of objective national levels of immigration.  A second hypothesis is that AP 
attitudes are more likely to prevail among those who feel that economic conditions have worsened 
in the recent past.  We measure this feeling, admittedly imperfectly, by looking at people’s 
assessments of whether they think their country’s economic circumstances have worsened or 
improved over the past year.  Our third proposition relates to the effects of national versus 
European identity.  We hypothesise that individuals who have an exclusively national identity are 
more likely to believe in the need to preserve the intergrity and character of the nation-state and 
hence are more likey to hold more authoritarian populist views.   
A fourth hypothesis concerns ‘negative valence’ – the idea that the incumbent governing party or 
parties is failing effectively to handle the most important problems facing the country.  Individuals 
who believe that the government is failing to deliver on multiple policy fronts are more likely to 
develop a rejectionist, AP mindset.  We measure valence assessments across seven policy domains 
(housing, education, immigration, the economy in general, defence, crime and unemployment) and 
expect our composite index to have a negative effect on our authoritarian populism scale.  Our fifth 
hypothesis relates to the possible role of ‘traditional social values’.  Since authoritarian populism is 
often seen as a regressive mindset that favours the re-establishment of a past (and sometimes 
mythical) political order, it follows that those who favour traditional social values will also tend to 
hold authoritarian populist views. We use two indicators of such values: agreement (a) with the idea 
that children should be obedient and respectful towards established authority and (b) with the idea 
that men and women should pursue very different gender roles in the home and the workplace.  We 
                                                          
1
 There is an extensive literature on populism that we draw on indirectly to generate these hypotheses. Our 
hypotheses are derived inter alia from Altmeyer (1981); Barnett (1982); Dix (1985); Ford and Goodwin (2014); 
Hall, Stewart and Jacques (1983); Jessop et al (1984); Jessop (2016); Jones (2007); Mudde (2004); Scase (1980);  
Stenner (2005); Wodak et al (2013). 
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expect these ideas to be positively associated with AP attitudes. A sixth set of explanatory variables 
relates to issue salience.  Here, we hypothesise that AP attitudes should be most prevalent among 
those who regard immigration or terrorism as the most important issue facing the country; and that 
they should be least prevalent among those who believe that the most important issue is the gap 
between  rich and poor.  Finally, we include controls for three key demographics variables: age, 
gender and education.  Given previous findings on voting support for populist parties, we expect AP 
attitudes to be associated positively with age and being male, and negatively with education.  
Our authoritarian populism dependent variable (APscale) is constructed separately for each country 
from alpha scale models based on the variables shown in Table 1. Our country-by-country model 
specification is: 
APscale = a + b1 NotHome + b2 EconomicRetrospections + b3 NationalIdentity + b4 Valence  
        + b5 Obedient + b6 DifferentRoles + b7 MIP-Immigration + b8 MIP-Terror + b9 MIP-Gap + I    [1] 
where all predictor variable terms are as defined in Table 3, MIP signifies Most Important Problem, 
and  I is a random error term.  We also estimate a pooled 10-country model, which adds two 
further, objective country-level control variables: the percentage of the population who were born 
outside the country as at January 2015 (%Foreign) and average percentage change in GDP 2005-
2015 (GDPchange).  The distributions of these variables are reported in Annex 1. Our pooled model 
specification is  
APscale = a + b1 NotHome + b2 EconomicRetrospections + b3 NationalIdentity + b4 Valence  
        + b5 Obedient + b6 DifferentRoles + b7 MIP-Immigration + b8 MIP-Terror + b9 MIP-Gap 
        + b10 %Foreign + b11 GDPchange + I                                                                                                [2] 
Table 4 estimates [1] for each of the ten countries where AP attitudes form a single scale.  Since 
APscale is a normally distributed interval-level measure, estimation is by OLS.  The final column of 
Table 4 estimates [2], using (country-)clustered regression with robust standard errors.  As the 
results show, the models are all reasonably well-determined.  Corrected R2 is a modest 0.30 in the 
Poland model, though this is by no means unusual with individual-level data.  For the remaining 
countries, R2 is always well above 0.40 and in the UK, France and Sweden it exceeds 0.60.  T he 
strongest support ofr hypotheses in terms of coefficient  signs and significance levels is in the UK.  All 
but three of the independent variables are significant and correctly signed.  The only exceptions are 
education (which is non-significant) and EconomicRetrospections and Valence assessments (which 
both have significant positive rather than negative effects).  For most of the remaining countries in 
Table 4 the results are broadly similar, with most predictors significant and correctly signed – though 
inevitably, as in the UK model, there are a small number of coefficients that do not match 
expectations.  The 10-country pooled model is reported in the extreme right-hand column of the 
table. The R2 of 0.48 indicates that the model is well-determined.  Of the individual-level coefficients, 
most are significant and correctly signed though non-significant effects are observed for 
EconomicRetrospections, Valence assessments and the priorisation of the Rich/Poor gap as the most 
important problem facing the country.  Both of the country-level variables also fail to achieve 
significance, suggesting that neither objective economic performance nor the objective size of the 
immigrant population have direct effects on authoritarian populist attitudes. 
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The overall coefficient pattern in Table 4 is summarised in Table 5.  A positive sign (+) denotes a 
significant positive estimated effect from Table 4; a negative sign (-) a significant negative effect; and 
a zero no effect.  The table also indicates the predicted effect based on our seven sets of 
hypotheses. Looking across the rows enables us to assess the number and types of effect that 
appear to operate in the different countries examined.  Thus, for example,  the most correctly-
predicted effects were evident in France and Sweden (both 10/12 effects correctly predicted) and 
the least in Poland (6/10 correct) and in Spain (only 4/10 correct). Looking down the columns tells us 
which predictor variables most consistently had effects in different countries.  Here, the consistent, 
correctly signed effects we observe (in nine out of our ten countries) are those for gender (men are 
more likely to hold AP views), for the sense that ‘it doesn’t feel like home round here any more’, for 
an exclusively national identity, and for the prioritising of immigration as the Most Important 
Problem facing the country.  Slightly less pervasive but still widespread effects are also observed  for 
traditional social values (particularly in relation to the need for children to be obedient and to 
repsect authority) and for the prioritising of the gap between rich and poor as the MIP. These may 
seem ‘obvious’ findings – they are – but the fact that the models consistently show these effects 
across different countries adds credence to our claim that our measure of authoritarian populist 
attitudes is indeed measuring something real and important. 
3. Europe’s emerging political tribes: evidence from Cluster Analyses 
The analysis we have conducted so far treats authoritarian populism as a single, continous scale on 
which any individual can be located.  The evidence presented in Tables 4 and 5 shows that 
individuals’ positions on this scale can be plausibly explained by a number of different individual-
level factors which seem to operate across our ten EU countries.  Yet, as we have also seen, there 
are country-by-country variations in the sizes, signs and significance levels of the different effect 
coefficients.  In addition, as we saw when we discussed factor models earlier, in some countries, left-
right ideological self-placement has a somewhat ambiguous correlation with the other components 
of the authoritarian populist mindset.  This begs the question as to whether we should perhaps be 
looking for the possible existence of distinct left-leaning and right-leaning populist sentient in 
different countries.  One obvious vehicle for such an exploration is cluster analysis.  This technique 
looks for distinct groupings of individuals (that is, who register similar scores) on a given set of 
characteristics.  In this case, the characteristics are the eight component indicators of authoritarian 
populism that we listed in Table 1.  Given that we know (a) from Table 2 that the intercorrelations 
among the eight components vary across countries and (b) from Table 4 that the sources of AP 
attitudes also vary across countries, we use separate country-specific cluster analyses to identify the 
different clusterings or ‘political tribes’ that characterise each of our ten countries. 
Table 6 provides an illustrative cluster analysis for the UK.  We estimate 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-cluster 
models.  It would be possible to estimate more clusters or groupings of individual respondents – as 
we do for some countries as reported below – but we stick at 5 clusters for the UK because with a 5-
cluster solution one of the clusters contains only 3% of respondents.   Our operating rule is that if a 
cluster contains 5 or less percent of the sampled population, it is unrealistic to describe that 
grouping as a ‘political tribe’.  We realise this is an arbitrary figure – but unless we had employed 
some decision rule, we could have estimated an ever-more differentiated set of groupings (which 
would also have been increasingly unstable, given that our effective sample size for most of our 
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analysed countries is under N=1000) that would probably have revealed very little about the ‘actual’ 
political tribes in each country. 
The first, 2-cluster, solution shown in Table 6 shows that Cluster 2 respondents score higher on each 
of the eight AP indicators than do Cluster 1 respondents.   However, the numerical differences 
between the two groups, though statistically significant, are not not particularly large – for example, 
the Cluster 1 mean for Negative Immigration Emotions is 0.84, compared with a igure of 1.10 for 
Cluster 2.  Moreover, if we were to describe all Cluster 2 respondents as Authoritarian Populists, we 
would not only be inferring that fully 64% of the UK electorate were AP or AP-incliners but doing so 
on the basis of relatively small differences in mean scores across the eight component items.   
The 3-cluster solution differentiates between two groupings previously within Cluster 1 of the 2-
cluster solution.  In the 3-cluster model, Cluster 2 respondents are clearly left-wing (mean score 
3.93) but they are also strongly anti-immigrant (Negative Emotions mean score=2.20; Opposed to 
non-EU Immigration score of 3.99), anti-EU (disapproval 4.25; anti-EU Institutions 2.86), supportive 
of the strong nation-state (Strong Foreign Policy .43; Patriotism Important  4.10), and critical of 
Human Rights (mean 3.78).  In short, these Cluster 2 respondents, who represent 14% of the 
electorate, exhibit most of the key characteristics of authoritarian populists, even though they are 
leftwing.   Bizarrely, they look more authoritarian populist than the 64% of respondents now in 
Cluster 3 (exactly the same group who were in Cluster 2 in the 2-cluster model) who also classify 
themselves, on average, as more right-wing.    
This is where the 4-cluster solution comes in.  This solution distinguishes between two groups inside 
Cluster 3 of the 3-cluster solution.  In Cluster 3 of the 4-cluster model, there is a clear centre-right 
group (mean ideology score=5.39) which is broadly sympathetic to immigration (mean Negative 
Emotions=.43), pro-EU (mean EU disapproval=2.08) moderate on foreign policy (mean score=.19), 
and relatively uncritical on Human Rights (mean score=2.65).  This group is very different from the 
more distinctly right-wing authoritarian populists indicated in Cluster 4 – who on average score 
noticeably higher on all eight of the component measures than the ‘social liberals’ in Cluster 3.  
The final segment of Table 6, for completeness, reports the results of a 5-cluster solution.  The key 
difference from the 4-cluster solution is that the 14% of left-wing APs in that model are now divided 
into two groups which look very similar across most of the eight components, though they do differ 
a little in terms of Immigration Emotions and antipathy towards Human Rights.  However, the 
Cluster 3 respondents in the 5-cluster solution constitute under 3% of our sample and thus fall below 
our self-imposed inferential threshold of the defintition of a distinct tribe or grouping.  We conclude 
that the 4-cluster solution shown in Table 6 makes the most sense in terms of identifying the UK’s 
most important political tribes.  As we indicate in the table, on the basis of the 4-cluster solution, we 
would characterise members of Cluster 1 as Left Liberals (23% of the electorate), Cluster 2 as Left 
Authoritarian Populists (14%), Cluster 3 as Centre-Right Liberals (30%), and Cluster 4 as Right-wing 
Authoritarian Populists (34%).  In short, in the UK at least, our AP distinction cuts across traditional 
notions of left and right.  A substantial proportion of the population (around 48% on our estimate) 
holding broadly AP attitudes, drawn from both right (34%) and left (14%) of the ideological 
spectrum. 
We repeated the analysis shown in Table 6 for each of the remaining nine countries in our reduced 
10-country sample.  The detailed results are reported in Annex 2 but Table 7 shows the headline 
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results.  The clusters reported represent our best estimates of the contemporary political tribes in 
each of our ten countries.  They also represent our conclusions about the character and size of the 
different authoritarian populist groupings in each country.  In France, for example, we estimate the 
size of the total AP population at 66%, divided into 25% who place themselves clearly on the 
ideological right and 41% who place themselves on the centre-right.  In Holland, in contrast, we 
observe only 30%, divided equally between right APs(15%) and centre-left APs (also 15%). Figure 1 
summarises the overall AP pattern across all ten countries.  In our view, these AP groupings (of 
admittedly different sorts) represent the support reservoirs for authoritarian populist parties in 
future elections in their respective countries. 
4. So what? Political Tribe Membership and Voting Intentions 
We suggested above that the authoritarian populist mindset is more prevalent among European 
mass publics than current levels of voting for right-wing populist parties would imply.  Figure 2 
compares the levels of AP opinion across our ten countries with the levels of populist party voting in 
their most recent general elections.  As the figure shows, the size of the AP reservoir in each country 
is clearly greater than the actual proportion of the population that voted right-wing populist.  Given 
that there are many other reasons why people vote the way they do – among them party 
identifications, leader affect, issue salience assessments and economic evaluations – this is not 
surprising.   Significantly, the same pattern is also evident if we compare the size of the AP ‘tribe(s)’ 
in each country with the intention to vote for a right-wing populist party in the next general election, 
as in Figure 3. As the figure indicates, the extent of AP sentiment is consistently greater than the 
proportion of voters intending to vote for a populist party. 
The relationship between authoritarian populist attitudes and party preferences is obviously more 
complicated thn the simpe observation that there are more authoritarian populists than right-wing 
populist voters. In order to make cross-national  comparisons feasible, we characteris the parties in 
each of our ten countries according to the classification provided by Wolfram Nordsieck at 
http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/countries.html.  We condense the party groupings summarised 
by Nordsieck into five ‘party family’ categories as follows: 
[1] Far left, including communist and radical left parties 
[2] Centre Left, including social democracy, green left and nationalist left parties 
[3] Centre, including liberal and social liberal parties 
[4] Centre Right, including Christian democrat, conservative, centre-right liberal parties 
[5] Right-wing Populist, including Eurosceptic, national conservative parties 
Thus, in the UK for example,  the Far Left category [1] is empty – though this may change in the 
future as the Labour left under Jeremy Corbyn consolidates its position within the party; category [2] 
contains Labour, the Scottish Nationalists, Plaid Cymru and the Greens; category [3] contains the 
Liberal Democrats; category [4] the Conservative; and category [5] UKIP and the British National 
Party.  The allocations of parties to categories in the other nine countries are outlined in Annex 3. 
Table 8 reports the simple relationship across our ten countries between party-family vote intention 
and whether or a respondent belongs to an authoritarian populist ‘tribe’.  The detailed country-
specific distributions are reported in Annex 4.   Annex 5 presents a simple ordered logistic model of 
the Party-Family variable, which shows that the strong bivariate relationship between vote intention 
and AP tribe persists in the face of multivariate controls.  
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The table differentiates between right-wing and left-wing AP tribes, the latter (8% of respondents) 
being much smaller than the former (37%).   It is clear from the table that there is a fairly strong, 
though by no means invariant, relationship between vote intention and tribe. Among the non-APs, 
support is distributed predominantly among the four non-Populist party groupings, with the Centre-
left, Centre and Centre-Right together attracting some 81% of the non-AP vote.  Among the left-APs, 
the votes are distributed across the five party groupings, though there is a clear tendency for them, 
despite their leftist ideological orientations,  to vote for either Centre-right (28%) or Right-wing 
Populist parties (25%).  Right-wing APs do not uniformly support right-wing parties.  Roughly one 
third of them (34%) support either Left, Centre-left or Centre parties, thought the other two-thirds 
clearly intend to vote either Centre-right or Populist right.   
The key figures in the RightAP column, however, are the 31% who support Centre-Right parties and 
and the 35% who intend to vote for Right-wing Populist parties.   At present, Centre-Right parties are 
just as successful at attracting the support of right-wing populist voters as are the right-wing populist 
parties themselves.  If this pattern continues, then right-wing populism in Europe may not progress 
much further beyond its current levels in the coming years.  But there is a real risk here.  On the one 
hand, Centre-right parties may feel that in order to meet voter concerns about immigration and the 
negative economic consequences of globalisation they need to transmute themselves in anti-
immigrant, protectionist Right-wing populist parties in order to survive electorally.  On the other 
hand, if Centre-right parties fail properly to respond to widespread voter concerns about these 
issues, they will find themselves undercut by the growing attraction of right-wing populist parties 
that will undoubtedly seek to mobilise as much of their potential authoritarian tribal support base as 
they possibly can.  The only real protection against the rising tide of authoritarian populist sentiment 
among European voters is for the entire liberal political establishment (from the Centre-left to the 
Centre-right) to start to talk openly and honestly about the long-term social costs of immigration and 
economic globalisation.  It is simply not good enough for liberals to emphasise the economic 
benefits of immigration and to castigate voters who are seduced by populist solutions with labels 
such as ‘ignorant’, ‘neo-fascist’ or ‘gullible’.  The concerns articulated by the members of the 
authoritarian populist tribe that we have outlined here are real.  They need to heard and addressed 
rather than condemned.  We are convinced that if they are ignored, the extensive authoritarian 
populist sentiment we have described risks being mobilised increasingly by right-wing populist 
parties whose simplistic solutions to complex problems risk serious social, economic and political 
damage. 
Summary and Conclusions 
‘Populism’ is often used imprecisely to describe anti-establishment political movements which 
propose simple solutions to complicated problems and which advocate popular policies that liberals 
find uncomfortable.  We have tried to avoid any such usage here.  Rather, we have described what 
we characterise as authoritarian populist sentiment among European mass publics as a mindset that 
combines a preference for strong national foreign policies with opposition to immigration, anti-
Europeanism, an antipathy to the liberal human rights agenda and a right-wing political orientation.  
We found evidence of this mindset in ten of the twelve countries that we surveyed in November 
2016.   In those ten countries, factor-analytic and alpha-scale models indicated the existence of a 
statistically coherent constellation of authoritarian attitudes. We showed in simple regression 
models that across all ten countries, individuals’ positions on an authoritarian populism scale could 
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be predicted reasonably satisfactorily by a series of theoretically-informed predictor variables.  In 
particular we found that the perceived community consequences of immigration, strong national 
identity and the prioritisation of immigration as an issue all had strong effects on AP orientations.   
Cluster analysis enabled us to explore the potential size of the AP population in each of our ten 
countries where we observed a clear AP scale.  Significantly, this analysis allowed us to differentiate 
between the right- and left-wing AP ‘tribes’ which exist in some countries. In our sample, there are 
sizeable left-AP groups in the UK, Finland, Poland, Italy and the Netherlands.  There is a also a large 
Centre-right AP group in France. Our analysis of the relationship between AP attitudes and vote 
intention shows that at the moment, centre-right parties across Europe can expect to garner as 
much support from authoritarian populist voters as can right-wing populist parties.  Our supposition, 
which we hope to have justified in the analysis here, is that members of the authoritarian populist 
tribes in different countries represent a potential support reservoir that may be attracted to populist 
parties in the future.  Donald Trump’s success in the US appears to show the power of an 
intelligently-targeted social media campaign to mobilise support among those who adhere to an 
authoritarian populist mindset.  It is likely that right wing populist parties in Europe will be seeking to 
emulate these efforts in the years ahead.  Those who would resist the rising tide of populism in 
Europe should start taking action now, aimed at persuading those members of the AP tribe who 
have not yet succumbed to the electoral atractions of right-wing populism not to switch their votes 
from their current, Centre-right intentions. 
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Figure 1: Levels Right-wing and Left-wing Authoritarian Populism in Ten European Countries 
 
Cluster-analysis-derived estimates of the percentages of the total electorate with an Authoritarian 
Populist (AP) mindset 
 
Figure 2: Right-wing Populist Voting in most recent General election in ten European Countries 
 
Percentage of votes cast for parties described by Wolfram Nordsieck party as right-wing populist, 
right-wing nationalist or Eurosceptic/National Conservative. Source: http://www.parties-and-
elections.eu/countries.html 
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Figure 3: Right-wing Populist Vote Intention and the size of the Authoritarian Populist ‘tribe’ in Ten 
European Countries 
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Table 1: Eight Indicators of Authoritarian Populism; Variable Definitions and Summary Measures (Mean scores in parentheses) 
 UK France Germany Sweden Denmark Finland Poland Italy Spain Romania Lithuania Holland All 
% Displaying Negative 
Emotions on Immigration 
57 
(1.1) 
72 
(1.3) 
60 
(1.1) 
66 
(1.5) 
63 
(1.6) 
68 
(1.5) 
75 
(1.4) 
68 
(1.2) 
53 
(0.8) 
64 
(1.2) 
60 
(1.0) 
59 
(1.1) 
63 
(1.2) 
% Agree Immigration from 
outside EU is a bad thing 
37 
(3.1) 
54 
(3.7) 
49 
(3.5) 
47 
(3.4) 
56 
(3.7) 
57 
(3.7) 
53 
(3.6) 
52 
(3.6) 
36 
(3.2) 
42 
(3.4) 
52 
(3.6) 
46 
(3.5) 
48 
(3.5) 
% Disapprove of EU 44 
(3.0) 
37 
(2.8) 
26 
(2.5) 
43 
(3.1) 
31 
(2.7) 
28 
(2.5) 
16 
(2.0) 
31 
(2.6) 
15 
(2.0) 
16 
(2.2) 
20 
(2.1) 
34 
(2.8) 
29 
(2.6) 
% Distrust EU Institutions 58 
(2.4) 
58 
(2.4) 
51 
(2.3) 
44 
(2.3) 
40 
(2.1) 
43 
(2.2) 
34 
(2.0) 
49 
(2.2) 
42 
(2.1) 
29 
(1.9) 
26 
(1.8) 
53 
(2.3) 
45 
(2.2) 
% Agree Foreign policy 
should be strong and tough 
31 
(.31) 
42 
(.42) 
11 
(.11) 
17 
(.17) 
17 
(.17) 
21 
(.21) 
30 
(.30) 
34 
(.34) 
22 
(.22) 
26 
(.26) 
20 
(.20) 
27 
(.27) 
25 
(.25) 
% Agree Patriotism is 
important 
62 
(3.7) 
71 
(4.0) 
43 
(3.4) 
49 
(3.4) 
45 
(3.4) 
65 
(3.8) 
69 
(3.9) 
61 
(3.7) 
49 
(3.4) 
75 
(4.1) 
65 
(3.8) 
43 
(3.4) 
58 
(3.7) 
% Critical of Human Rights 38 
(3.0) 
43 
(3.3) 
30 
(3.0) 
27 
(2.8) 
24 
(2.8) 
36 
(3.1) 
37 
(3.2) 
37 
(3.1) 
33 
(3.0) 
45 
(3.4) 
45 
(3.4) 
29 
(3.0) 
36 
(3.1) 
Mean score on 0-10 self-
placement Left-Right scale 
5.0 5.5 4.8 5.3 5.3 5.1 5.3 5.4 4.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.2 
N of cases 1711 1002 1046 1008 1008 1006 1016 1012 1010 1012 1015 1015 12860 
For individual country models, data weighted by in-country weights.  For pooled model, data weighted to equal Ns across countries. 
Question wordings and codings were as follows: 
Negative Immigration Emotions. Which, if any, of the following words describe your feelings about immigration? (Please tick up to four). Response options:  
Angry, Happy, Disgusted, Hopeful, Uneasy, Confident, Afraid, Proud.  The number of negative emotions (Angry, Disgusted, Uneasy, Afraid) is counted to 
create a 0-4 index 
Immigration is a bad thing.  Generally speaking, do you think Immigration from countries outside the EU is a good or bad thing for [COUNTRY]? Response 
options: A very good thing (coded 1) ; A fairly good thing (coded 2) ; Neither good nor bad (3);  A fairly bad thing (coded 4);  A very bad thing (coded 5); DK 
recoded as 3 
EU disapproval. Overall, (did) do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of COUNTRY'S membership of the European Union? 
Response options:  Strongly approve (coded 1); Approve (coded 2); Don’t Know (coded 3); Disapprove (coded 4); Strongly Disapprove (coded 5). 
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Distrust EU institutions.  For each of the following institutions, please say whether you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: European Commission;    
European Parliament.  Response options: Tend to trust (coded 1); Don’t Know (coded 2); Tend not to trust (coded 3). 
Foreign policy should be strong and tough. From the list of priorities, please select the one you think is the most important for [Country]: 1 Helping the rest 
of the world by providing foreign aid and protecting human rights; 2 Solving international problems by working with other nations and working through 
international organizations; 3 Protecting COUNTRY'S interests by being strong and tough with other nations and maintaining a powerful military; 4 Avoiding 
involvement with other nations by simply minding our own business in international affairs; 5 None of these; 6 Don’t know. Respondents who select option 
3 are coded as 1; all others are coded as zero. 
Patriotism is important.  It is important for [country’s] people to be patriotic towards [country].  Response Options: Strongly Agree (coded 5); Agree (coded 
4); Neither/Don’t Know (coded 3); Disagree (coded 2); Strongly Disagree (coded 1). 
Critical of Human Rights.  To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: People who talk about protecting human rights are mainly 
interested in protecting the rights of criminals, not those of their victims. Response Options and codings as for Patriotism is important. 
Left-Right self-placement. People sometimes use the labels 'left' or 'left wing' and 'right' or 'right wing' to describe political parties, party leaders, and 
political ideas.  Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means left and the end marked 10 means right, where would you place yourself on 
this scale? 
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Table 2: Summary of Factor Analyses and Alpha-scaling analyses in 12 EU Countries 
 
 Factor 1 Loadings 
 UK France German Sweden Denmk Finlnd Poland Italy Spain Roman Lithua Holland Ten* 
Negative Immigration Emotions .71 .67 .64 .77 .69 .62 .48 .61 .51 .46 .38 .59 .65 
Non-EU Immigration is a bad thing .67 .73 .70 .81 .75 .70 .53 .64 .52 .43 .36 .62 .67 
Disapproval of EU .76 .51 .48 .59 .48 .58 .55 .61 -.24 .43 .45 .64 .54 
Distrust of EU Institutions .63 .38 .44 .56 .50 .57 .62 .49 -.24 .50 .50 .55 .48 
Foreign policy strong and tough .52 .45 .26 .43 .39 .25 .47 .36 .31 .22 .07 .40 .40 
Patriotism is important .68 .50 .51 .70 .61 .39 .27 .35 .59 .14 .09 .47 .52 
Critical of Human Rights .73 .61 .51 .64 .60 .63 .39 .49 .42 .24 .39 .47 .57 
Left-Right self-placement .60 .52 .50 .48 .47 .18 .44 -.40 .53 -.12 -.07 .38 .37 
Factor 1 Eigenvalue 3.55 2.47 2.18 3.22 2.64 2.17 1.83 2.03 1.55 0.97 0.89 2.19 2.29 
Factor 2 Eigenvalue 0.16 0.48 0.25 0.56 0.68 0.68 0.41 0.41 0.91 0.37 0.54 0.32 0.50 
Alpha scale coefficient 0.84 0.70 0.72 0.79 0.73 0.66 0.62 0.66 0.59 0.37 0.36 0.70 0.70 
Mean Alpha scale score (range 0-1) .45 .70 .31 .49 .50 .49 .41 .60 .24 -- -- .33 .45 
N of cases 1265 815 873 881 911 783 849 815 908 716 723 821 8921 
* Pooled models across ten countries, excluding Romania and Lithuania; no Alpha scale scores for Romania and Lithuania 
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Table 3: Independent Variable Definitions and Summary Scores 
Variable Name Variable definition Range Mean 
Demographic Controls   
Age Respondent’s age in years 18-80 45.20 
Male Respondent’s sex: male=1; female =0 0-1 0.48 
Education 3-category YouGov coding of education level 1-3 2.22 
Cultural and Economic factors   
NotHome Likert agreement/disagreement scale with ‘There are so many foreigners around here that it doesn’t feel like home 
any more’ 
1-5 2.90 
Economic 
Retrospections 
How do you think the COUNTRY economy has changed over the LAST 12 months? Response option codings: Got a lot 
better (5); Got a little better (4); Stayed the same/DK (3); Got a little worse (2); Got a lot worse (1) 
1-5 2.62 
National Identity Do you see yourself as...?  Response options: NATIONALITY only; NATIONALITY and European; European and 
NATIONALITY; European only; Other; Don’t know. NATIONALITY only coded as 1; others as zero. 
0-1 0.37 
Valence 
Assessments 
How well or badly do you think the government is handling the issue of...?  Seven issues assessed: housing, education, 
immigration, the economy in general, defence, crime and unemployment.  For each issue, response options were: 
Very Well (coded 5); Fairly well (4); Don’t Know (3); Fairly badly (2); Very badly (5).  A combined index was calculated 
by summing the individual scores on each of the seven items and dividing by 7. 
1-5 2.38 
Traditional Social Values   
Obedient Likert agreement/disagreement scale with ‘Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues 
children should learn’ 
1-5 3.26 
Different Roles Likert agreement/disagreement scale with ‘Men and women each have different roles to play in society’ 1-5 2.96 
Issue Salience   
MIP-Immigration Which two of these problems are most important facing [COUNTRY] just now? Respondents specifying ‘The level of 
immigration’ coded 1; not zero 
0-1 0.44 
MIP-Terror Which two of these problems are most important facing [COUNTRY] just now? Respondents specifying ‘The threat of 
international terrorism or aggression’ coded 1; not zero 
0-1 0.37 
MIP-Gap Which two of these problems are most important facing [COUNTRY] just now? Respondents specifying ‘The gap 
between rich and poor’ coded 1; not zero 
0-1 0.42 
Country-level controls   
%Foreign Percentage of non-native born inhabitants of the country 2015 (source Eurostat) .7-7 3.20 
GDPchange Annual average percentage change in GDP per capita 2005-2015 (source Eurostat) .3-9.6 5.55 
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Table 4, Part 1: OLS Models of Authoritarian Populism Scale Scores 
 
b=coefficient; st = standard error; p = probability. For individual country models, data weighted by in-country weights.   
For pooled model, data weighted to equal Ns across countries 
 
 
 
 UK France Germany Sweden Denmark 
 b st p b st p b st p b st p b st p 
Demographic Controls 
Age .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .06 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 
Male .12 .02 .00 .09 .03 .05 .12 .03 .00 .17 .03 .00 .11 .03 .00 
Education .02 .02 .19 -.01 .03 .79 -.02 .02 .32 .04 .02 .07 .05 .02 .02 
Cultural and Economic factors 
NoHome .22 .01 .00 .19 .01 .00 .24 .01 .00 .26 .01 .00 .25 .02 .00 
EconRetro .08 .02 .00 -.08 .02 .00 -.01 .02 .77 -.10 .02 .00 -.02 .02 .43 
Natid .22 .03 .00 .19 .03 .00 .14 .03 .00 .16 .03 .00 .18 .03 .00 
Valence .08 .02 .00 -.23 .02 .00 -.17 .02 .00 -.22 .02 .00 .03 .02 .15 
Traditional Social Values 
Obedience .06 .01 .00 .12 .02 .00 .05 .01 .00 .05 .01 .00 .09 .02 .00 
DiffRole .07 .01 .00 .01 .01 .64 .02 .01 .06 .03 .01 .02 .03 .02 .07 
Issue Salience 
MIP-Immig .42 .03 .00 .28 .04 .00 .20 .03 .00 .14 .03 .00 .36 .04 .00 
MIP-Terror .09 .03 .00 .09 .03 .01 .05 .03 .10 .02 .06 .77 .05 .04 .21 
MIP-Gap -.12 .04 .00 -.19 .04 .00 -.05 .03 .09 -.14 .04 .00 -.14 .04 .00 
Constant .41 .08 .00 2.08 .11 .00 1.68 .12 .00 1.93 .11 .00 .91 .12 .00 
Ctd R2 .63 .62 .55 .69 .54 
N 1711 1001 1045 1016 1008 
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Table 4, Part 2: OLS Models of Authoritarian Populism Scale Scores  
 Finland Poland Italy Spain Holland Ten Countries 
 b st p b st p b st p b st p b st p b st p 
Demographic Controls    
Age .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .39 -.01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .12 .00 .00 .10 .01 .00 .01 
Male .15 .03 .00 .19 .04 .00 -.01 .04 .87 .08 .03 .02 .16 .03 .00 .11 .03 .00 
Education .08 .03 .00 .09 .03 .00 -.17 .03 .00 .05 .02 .01 -.03 .02 .20 .10 .04 .00 
Cultural and Economic factors     
NoHome .24 .01 .00 .02 .02 .32 .20 .02 .00 .18 .02 .00 .22 .01 .00 .19 .02 .00 
EconRetro -.02 .02 .33 .10 .02 .00 -.19 .02 .00 .07 .02 .00 .01 .02 .61 -.04 .03 .17 
Natid .18 .03 .00 .35 .04 .00 .34 .04 .00 .07 .04 .11 .15 .03 .00 .33 .06 .00 
Valence -.00 .02 .91 .15 .02 .00 -.16 .03 .00 .22 .02 .00 -.22 .02 .00 .02 .06 .79 
Traditional Social Values     
Obedience .06 .02 .00 .01 .02 .60 .03 .02 .11 .12 .02 .00 .04 .02 .01 .06 .02 .01 
DifferentRoles .05 .01 .00 .10 .02 .00 .05 .02 .01 -.04 .01 .00 .02 .02 .12 .07 .02 .01 
Issue Salience     
MIP-Immig .29 .04 .00 .29 .07 .00 .25 .05 .00 -.02 .07 .80 .32 .03 .00 .47 .08 .00 
MIP-Terror .22 .09 .01 .18 .05 .00 -.01 .07 .87 .19 .06 .00 .01 .03 .73 .17 .06 .02 
MIP-Gap -.05 .03 .11 .14 .04 .00 -.14 .05 .01 -.15 .05 .00 -.16 .04 .00 -.06 .05 .29 
Constant 1.01 .12 .00 1.13 .12 .00 1.94 .12 .00 -.35 .09 .00 2.03 .13 .00 1.05 .34 .01 
Country-level controls     
Foreign                -.07 .04 .11 
GDPchange                .13 .11 .27 
Ctd R2 .49 .30 .52 .44 .47 .46 
N 1006 1016 1012 1010 1016 10834 
b=coefficient; st = standard error; p = probability.  Ten Country Model based on Country-clustered OLS with robust standard errors.  
For individual country models, data weighted by in-country weights.  For pooled model, data weighted to equal Ns across countries 
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Table 5: Summary of Findings from Regression Models Reported in Table 4, Parts 1 and 2 
 Independent Variable 
 Age Male Educ No 
Home 
Econ 
Retro 
Natid Valence Obed- 
ience 
Diff 
Role 
MIP- 
Immig 
MIP- 
Terror 
MIP- 
Gap 
Coeffs 
Correct 
Predicted Effect + + - + - + - + + + + -  
Observed Effect              
  UK + + 0 + + + + + + + + - 9/12 
  France + + 0 + - + - + 0 + + - 10/12 
  Germany + + 0 + 0 + - + + + 0 0 8/12 
  Sweden + + 0 + - + - + + + 0 - 10/12 
  Denmark + + + + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 - 7/12 
  Finland + + + + 0 + 0 + + + + 0 8/12 
  Poland 0 + + 0 + + + 0 + + + + 6/12 
  Italy - 0 - + - + - 0 + + 0 - 8/12 
  Spain 0 + + + + 0 + - 0 0 + - 4/12 
  Holland 0 + 0 + 0 + - + 0 + 0 - 7/12 
  Ten Countries + + + + 0 + 0 + + + + 0 7/12 
Coeffs Correct 6/10 9/10 1/10 9/10 3/10 9/10 5/10 7/10 6/10 9/10 5/10 7/10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
Table 6: Cluster Analyses of the Eight Component Authoritarian Populism Indicators, UK as an Illustration 
 Component Indicator 
 Negative 
Immigration 
Emotions 
Non-EU 
Immigration 
Bad thing 
Disapproval 
Of EU 
Distrust EU 
Institutions 
Foreign Policy 
Strong and 
Tough 
Patriotism 
Important 
Critical of 
Human 
Rights 
Left-Right 
Self- 
placement 
Percentage 
In cluster 
2-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 0.84 2.72 2.51 2.14 0.16 3.10 2.39 3.02 36 
Cluster 2 1.10 3.19 3.23 2.61 0.38 4.01 3.27 6.13 64 
3-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 0.13 2.07 1.61 1.77 0.03 2.58 1.67 2.55 23 
Cluster 2 2.20 3.99 4.25 2.86 0.43 4.10 3.78 3.93 14 
Cluster 3 1.10 3.19 3.23 2.61 0.38 4.01 3.27 6.13 64 
4-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 0.13 2.07 1.61 1.77 0.03 2.58 1.67 2.55 23 
Cluster 2 2.20 3.99 4.25 2.86 0.43 4.10 3.78 3.93 14 
Cluster 3 0.43 2.61 2.08 2.29 0.19 3.58 2.65 5.39 30 
Cluster 4 1.72 3.73 4.30 2.91 0.55 4.41 3.84 6.81 34 
5-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 0.13 2.07 1.61 1.77 0.03 2.58 1.67 2.55 23 
Cluster 2 2.41 3.99 4.20 2.86 0.43 4.20 3.94 4.41 11 
Cluster 3 1.21 3.96 4.46 2.86 0.43 3.61 3.04 1.61 3 
Cluster 4 0.43 2.61 2.08 2.29 0.19 3.58 2.65 5.39 30 
Cluster 5 1.72 3.73 4.30 2.91 0.55 4.41 3.84 6.81 34 
Overall UK average 1.00 3.02 2.96 2.43 0.30 3.67 2.94 4.96  
Range 0-4 1-5 1-5 1-3 0-1 1-5 1-5 0-10  
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Table 7: Estimated Political Tribes in Ten European Countries, based on Cluster Analyses Conducted in Table 6 and Annex 2 
 
Country and number of clusters Political Tribe Percentage 
of Electorate 
Country and number of clusters Political Tribe Percentage 
of Electorate 
UK: 4-cluster solution Left liberals  23 Finland: 6-cluster solution Left liberals 8 
 Left AP 14  Left AP 14 
 Centre-right liberals 30  Centre-left liberals 20 
 Right AP 34  Centre-right liberals 22 
France: 3-cluster solution Left liberals 34  Centre-right AP 25 
 Centre-right AP 41  Right AP 11 
 Right AP 25 Poland Left liberals 22 
Germany: 4-cluster solution Left liberals 19  Centre-left AP 23 
 Centre-left liberals 50  Centre-right liberals 35 
 Centre-right AP 24  Right AP 20 
 Right AP 7 Italy Left liberals 13 
Sweden: 3-cluster solution Left liberals 41  Left AP 16 
 Right liberals 16  Centre-right AP 47 
 Centre-right AP 43  Right liberals 25 
Denmark: 4-cluster solution Left liberals 26 Spain Left liberals 23 
 Centre-left liberals 24  Centre-left liberals 46 
 Centre-right AP 37  Right AP 36 
 Right AP 12 Holland Left liberals 10 
    Centre-left liberals 26 
    Centre-left AP 15 
    Centre-right liberals 33 
    Right AP 15 
AP signifies Authoritarian Populist; data weighted by in-country weights  
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Table 8: Bivariate Relationship between Party Family Vote Intention Membership of an Authoritarian Populist tribe, across ten pooled European 
Countries 
 
 AP tribe status  
 Not in an AP  
Tribe (55%) 
Member of 
Left AP tribe (8%) 
Member of 
Right AP tribe (37%) 
Percentage of all those 
with vote intention 
Party Family     
Far Left 13 12 6 11 
Centre Left 40 19 15 27 
Centre 16 16 13 15 
Centre Right 27 28 31 29 
Right Wing Populist 6 25 35 19 
Column percentages reported; data weighted to equal Ns across countries  
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Annex 1.  Country-level measures: size of foreign born population 2015 and Annual Average percentage growth in GDP 2006-2015 
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Annex 2: Country-specific Cluster Analyses of the Eight Component Authoritarian Populism Indicators 
Table A2.1: France 
 Component Indicator 
 Negative 
Immigration 
Emotions 
Non-EU 
Immigration 
Bad thing 
Disapproval 
Of EU 
Distrust EU 
Institutions 
Foreign Policy 
Strong and 
Tough 
Patriotism 
Important 
Critical of 
Human 
Rights 
Left-Right 
Self- 
placement 
Percentage 
In cluster 
2-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.60 3.96 2.78 2.44 0.53 4.25 3.54 7.07 66 
Cluster 2   0.78 3.07 2.66 2.41 0.25 3.65 2.78 2.04 34 
3-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.31 3.69 2.47 2.36 0.47 4.10 2.36 5.53 41 
Cluster 2 2.03 4.34 3.22 2.54 0.61 4.50 3.89 9.24 25 
Cluster 3   0.78 3.07 2.66 2.41 0.25 3.65 2.78 2.04 34 
4-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.31 3.69 2.47 2.36 0.47 4.10 2.36 5.53 41 
Cluster 2 2.03 4.34 3.22 2.54 0.61 4.50 3.89 9.24 25 
Cluster 3 0.61 2.90 2.46 2.36 0.22 3.53 2.64 2.15 30 
Cluster 4 2.31 4.50 4.35 2.83 0.54 4.73 3.96 1.19 3 
Overall  average 1.36 3.69 2.74 2.42 0.44 4.07 3.31 5.55  
Range 0-4 1-5 1-5 1-3 0-1 1-5 1-5 0-10  
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Table A2.2: Germany 
 Component Indicator 
 Negative 
Immigration 
Emotions 
Non-EU 
Immigration 
Bad thing 
Disapproval 
Of EU 
Distrust EU 
Institutions 
Foreign Policy 
Strong and 
Tough 
Patriotism 
Important 
Critical of 
Human 
Rights 
Left-Right 
Self- 
placement 
Percentage 
In cluster 
2-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.20 3.60 2.56 2.39 0.14 3.58 3.10 5.40 81 
Cluster 2 0.67 3.03 2.04 2.26 0.05 2.60 2.27 2.14 19 
3-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.17 3.53 2.54 2.37 0.12 3.53 3.07 5.14 74 
Cluster 2 1.47 4.30 2.70 2.55 0.28 4.12 3.48 8.22 7 
Cluster 3 0.67 3.03 2.04 2.26 0.05 2.60 2.27 2.14 19 
4-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 2.24 4.46 3.50 2.76 0.19 3.94 3.76 6.17 24 
Cluster 2 0.66 3.09 2.08 2.18 0.09 3.34 2.73 4.64 50 
Cluster 3 1.47 4.30 2.70 2.55 0.28 4.12 3.48 8.22 7 
Cluster 4 0.67 3.03 2.04 2.26 0.05 2.60 2.27 2.14 19 
5-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 2.24 4.46 3.50 2.76 0.19 3.94 3.76 6.17 24 
Cluster 2 0.66 3.09 2.08 2.18 0.09 3.34 2.73 4.64 50 
Cluster 3 1.47 4.30 2.70 2.55 0.28 4.12 3.48 8.22 7 
Cluster 4 1.59 3.90 2.84 2.48 0.04 3.61 2.90 1.76 5 
Cluster 5 0.25 2.63 1.67 2.16 0.05 2.14 1.97 2.32 13 
Overall  average 1.10 3.50 2.46 2.36 0.12 3.40 2.95 4.79  
Range 0-4 1-5 1-5 1-3 0-1 1-5 1-5 0-10  
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Table A2.3: Sweden 
 Component Indicator 
 Negative 
Immigration 
Emotions 
Non-EU 
Immigration 
Bad thing 
Disapproval 
Of EU 
Distrust EU 
Institutions 
Foreign Policy 
Strong and 
Tough 
Patriotism 
Important 
Critical of 
Human 
Rights 
Left-Right 
Self- 
placement 
Percentage 
In cluster 
2-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 2.06 3.92 3.35 2.43 0.25 3.89 3.25 6.89 59 
Cluster 2 0.61 2.52 2.68 2.05 0.04 2.78 2.08 2.87 41 
3-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 2.44 4.31 3.69 2.60 0.29 4.14 3.54 6.76 43 
Cluster 2 0.61 2.42 2.03 1.80 0.10 2.90 2.12 7.40 16 
Cluster 3 0.61 2.52 2.68 2.05 0.04 2.78 2.08 2.87 41 
4-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 2.44 4.31 3.69 2.60 0.29 4.14 3.54 6.76 43 
Cluster 2 0.61 2.42 2.03 1.80 0.10 2.90 2.12 7.40 16 
Cluster 3 0.46 2.38 2.60 2.02 0.03 2.68 1.97 2.92 39 
Cluster 4 3.05 4.70 3.95 2.65 0.25 4.40 3.80 1.75 2 
Overall  average 1.50 3.38 3.09 2.89 0.17 3.46 2.80 5.34  
Range 0-4 1-5 1-5 1-3 0-1 1-5 1-5 0-10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
Table A2.4: Denmark 
 Component Indicator 
 Negative 
Immigration 
Emotions 
Non-EU 
Immigration 
Bad thing 
Disapproval 
Of EU 
Distrust EU 
Institutions 
Foreign Policy 
Strong and 
Tough 
Patriotism 
Important 
Critical of 
Human 
Rights 
Left-Right 
Self- 
placement 
Percentage 
In cluster 
2-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 0.75 3.18 2.60 2.13 0.07 2.89 2.15 2.34 26 
Cluster 2 1.32 3.84 2.69 2.14 0.20 3.54 2.95 6.42 74 
3-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 0.75 3.18 2.60 2.13 0.07 2.89 2.15 2.34 26 
Cluster 2 1.21 3.83 2.72 2.18 0.18 3.52 2.88 3.83 62 
Cluster 3 1.82 3.92 2.58 1.94 0.28 3.57 3.27 3.92 12 
4-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 0.75 3.18 2.60 2.13 0.07 2.89 2.15 2.34 26 
Cluster 2 1.6 4.21 2.94 2.28 0.23 3.86 3.10 6.67 37 
Cluster 3 0.45 3.19 2.35 2.00 0.09 3.00 2.51 4.75 24 
Cluster 4 1.82 3.92 2.58 1.94 0.28 3.57 3.27 8.75 12 
5-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 0.45 2.93 2.50 2.02 0.03 2.66 1.95 2.27 22 
Cluster 2 2.31 4.49 3.15 2.69 0.31 4.07 3.20 2.72 4 
Cluster 3 1.6 4.21 2.94 2.28 0.23 3.86 3.10 6.67 37 
Cluster 4 0.45 3.19 2.35 2.00 0.09 3.00 2.51 4.75 24 
Cluster 5 1.82 3.92 2.58 1.94 0.28 3.57 3.27 8.75 12 
Overall  average 1.16 3.66 2.67 2.13 0.16 3.36 2.73 5.32  
Range 0-4 1-5 1-5 1-3 0-1 1-5 1-5 0-10  
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Table A2.5: Finland 
 Component Indicator 
 Negative 
Immigration 
Emotions 
Non-EU 
Immigration 
Bad thing 
Disapproval 
Of EU 
Distrust EU 
Institutions 
Foreign Policy 
Strong and 
Tough 
Patriotism 
Important 
Critical of 
Human 
Rights 
Left-Right 
Self- 
placement 
Percentage 
In cluster 
2-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.54 3.72 2.48 2.18 0.26 3.98 3.22 6.02 78 
Cluster 2 1.35 3.31 2.14 2.10 0.12 3.39 2.57 2.11 22 
3-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.57 3.86 2.78 2.35 0.22 3.94 3.25 4.82 45 
Cluster 2 1.28 3.51 2.06 1.94 0.31 4.02 3.18 7.73 33 
Cluster 3 1.35 3.31 2.14 2.10 0.12 3.39 2.57 2.11 22 
4-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.57 3.86 2.78 2.35 0.22 3.94 3.25 4.82 45 
Cluster 2 1.28 3.51 2.06 1.94 0.31 4.02 3.18 7.73 33 
Cluster 3 0.29 2.23 1.45 1.77 0.00 2.77 1.53 2.12 8 
Cluster 4 2.11 4.05 2.62 2.33 0.20 3.82 3.31 2.11 14 
5-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.57 3.86 2.78 2.35 0.22 3.94 3.25 4.82 45 
Cluster 2 0.47 2.91 1.70 1.73 0.24 3.89 2.70 7.50 22 
Cluster 3 2.81 4.66 2.73 2.35 0.45 4.29 4.08 8.16 11 
Cluster 4 0.29 2.23 1.45 1.77 0.00 2.77 1.53 2.12 8 
Cluster 5 2.11 4.05 2.62 2.33 0.20 3.82 3.31 2.11 14 
6-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 2.36 4.34 3.15 2.57 0.27 4.18 3.62 5.25 25 
Cluster 2 0.60 3.27 2.33 2.08 0.16 3.66 2.80 4.30 20 
Cluster 3 0.47 2.91 1.70 1.73 0.24 3.89 2.70 7.50 22 
Cluster 4 2.81 4.66 2.73 2.35 0.45 4.29 4.08 8.16 11 
Cluster 5 0.29 2.23 1.45 1.77 0.00 2.77 1.53 2.12 8 
Cluster 6 2.11 4.05 2.62 2.33 0.20 3.82 3.31 2.11 14 
Overall  average 1.43 3.62 2.40 2.16 0.23 3.84 3.07 5.10  
Range 0-4 1-5 1-5 1-3 0-1 1-5 1-5 0-10  
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Table A2.6: Poland 
 Component Indicator 
 Negative 
Immigration 
Emotions 
Non-EU 
Immigration 
Bad thing 
Disapproval 
Of EU 
Distrust EU 
Institutions 
Foreign Policy 
Strong and 
Tough 
Patriotism 
Important 
Critical of 
Human 
Rights 
Left-Right 
Self- 
placement 
Percentage 
In cluster 
2-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.53 3.68 2.04 2.01 0.33 4.05 3.20 6.22 78 
Cluster 2 1.20 3.37 1.56 1.48 0.17 3.74 2.94 1.97 22 
3-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.93 4.17 2.55 2.55 0.55 4.42 3.74 9.28 20 
Cluster 2 1.43 3.56 1.91 1.87 0.28 3.95 3.06 5.41 58 
Cluster 3 1.20 3.37 1.56 1.48 0.17 3.74 2.94 1.97 22 
4-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1   1.93 4.17 2.55 2.55 0.55 4.42 3.74 9.28 20 
Cluster 2 1.33 3.41 1.67 1.80 0.26 3.75 2.62 5.75 34 
Cluster 3 1.58 3.77 2.77 1.99 0.31 4.25 3.75 4.89 24 
Cluster 4 1.20 3.37 1.56 1.48 0.17 3.74 2.94 1.97 22 
5-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1   1.93 4.17 2.55 2.55 0.55 4.42 3.74 9.28 20 
Cluster 2 1.33 3.41 1.67 1.80 0.26 3.75 2.62 5.75 34 
Cluster 3 1.58 3.77 2.77 1.99 0.31 4.25 3.75 4.89 24 
Cluster 4 0.90 3.12 1.38 1.37 0.16 3.66 2.66 2.17 17 
Cluster 5 2.38 4.35 2.27 1.89 0.24 4.05 4.05 1.19 5 
Overall  average 1.46 3.61 1.92 1.90 0.30 3.98 3.14 5.30  
Range 0-4 1-5 1-5 1-3 0-1 1-5 1-5 0-10  
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Table A2.7: Italy 
 Component Indicator 
 Negative 
Immigration 
Emotions 
Non-EU 
Immigration 
Bad thing 
Disapproval 
Of EU 
Distrust EU 
Institutions 
Foreign Policy 
Strong and 
Tough 
Patriotism 
Important 
Critical of 
Human 
Rights 
Left-Right 
Self- 
placement 
Percentage 
In cluster 
2-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.42 3.74 2.62 2.19 0.38 3.86 3.26 4.25 75 
Cluster 2 0.71 2.95 2.09 2.09 0.21 3.53 2.66 8.60 25 
3-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.43 3.80 2.41 2.10 0.35 3.87 3.32 5.32 47 
Cluster 2 1.40 3.64 3.03 2.36 0.44 3.84 3.15 2.22 28 
Cluster 3 0.71 2.95 2.09 2.09 0.21 3.53 2.66 8.60 25 
4-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.43 3.80 2.41 2.10 0.35 3.87 3.32 5.32 47 
Cluster 2 0.87 3.17 2.97 2.23 0.35 3.58 2.65 3.73 13 
Cluster 3 1.93 4.10 3.10 2.47 0.52 4.11 3.66 0.69 15 
Cluster 4 0.71 2.95 2.09 2.09 0.21 3.53 2.66 8.60 25 
5-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.43 3.80 2.41 2.10 0.35 3.87 3.32 5.32 47 
Cluster 2 0.87 3.17 2.97 2.23 0.35 3.58 2.65 3.73 13 
Cluster 3 1.93 4.10 3.10 2.47 0.52 4.11 3.66 0.69 15 
Cluster 4 1.58 4.27 2.75 2.19 0.39 4.18 2.59 9.18 6 
Cluster 5 0.46 2.56 1.90 2.05 0.16 3.34 2.68 8.43 19 
Overall  average 1.22 3.53 2.48 2.48 0.33 3.77 3.09 5.45  
Range 0-4 1-5 1-5 1-3 0-1 1-5 1-5 0-10  
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Table A2.8: Spain 
 Component Indicator 
 Negative 
Immigration 
Emotions 
Non-EU 
Immigration 
Bad thing 
Disapproval 
Of EU 
Distrust EU 
Institutions 
Foreign Policy 
Strong and 
Tough 
Patriotism 
Important 
Critical of 
Human 
Rights 
Left-Right 
Self- 
placement 
Percentage 
In cluster 
2-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 0.71 3.12 2.05 2.17 0.19 3.29 2.86 3.33 70 
Cluster 2 0.96 3.51 1.62 1.83 0.35 4.07 3.34 7.94 30 
3-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 0.60 2.98 2.43 2.41 0.14 2.85 2.54 1.16 23 
Cluster 2 0.77 3.19 1.87 2.06 0.21 2.49 3.00 4.30 47 
Cluster 3 0.96 3.51 1.62 1.83 0.35 4.07 3.34 7.94 30 
4-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 0.60 2.98 2.43 2.41 0.14 2.85 2.54 1.16 23 
Cluster 2 0.77 3.19 1.87 2.06 0.21 2.49 3.00 4.30 47 
Cluster 3 1.00 3.48 1.41 1.74 0.38 4.35 3.41 8.05 27 
Cluster 4 0.62 3.71 3.47 2.67 0.14 1.71 2.81 6.95 3 
Overall  average 0.77 3.21 1.95 2.09 0.22 3.46 2.97   
Range 0-4 1-5 1-5 1-3 0-1 1-5 1-5 0-10  
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Table A2.9: Holland 
 Component Indicator 
 Negative 
Immigration 
Emotions 
Non-EU 
Immigration 
Bad thing 
Disapproval 
Of EU 
Distrust EU 
Institutions 
Foreign Policy 
Strong and 
Tough 
Patriotism 
Important 
Critical of 
Human 
Rights 
Left-Right 
Self- 
placement 
Percentage 
In cluster 
2-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.35 3.76 2.79 2.45 0.31 3.53 3.20 6.94 49 
Cluster 2 0.98 3.28 2.71 2.17 0.23 3.28 2.68 3.70 51 
3-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.35 3.76 2.79 2.45 0.31 3.53 3.20 6.94 49 
Cluster 2 2.14 4.23 3.98 2.78 0.41 3.80 3.57 4.50 15 
Cluster 3 0.51 2.89 2.19 1.93 0.15 3.06 2.31 3.37 36 
4-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 1.35 3.76 2.79 2.45 0.31 3.53 3.20 6.94 49 
Cluster 2 2.14 4.23 3.98 2.78 0.41 3.80 3.57 4.50 15 
Cluster 3 0.57 3.01 1.99 2.18 0.14 2.68 2.30 1.15 10 
Cluster 4 0.49 2.85 2.26 1.84 0.16 3.19 2.32 4.15 26 
5-Cluster solution          
Cluster 1 0.92 3.45 2.12 2.25 0.19 3.36 3.04 6.47 34 
Cluster 2 2.09 4.29 3.95 2.80 0.52 3.82 4.49 7.73 15 
Cluster 3 2.14 4.23 3.98 2.78 0.41 3.80 3.57 4.50 15 
Cluster 4 0.57 3.01 1.99 2.18 0.14 2.68 2.30 1.15 10 
Cluster 5 0.49 2.85 2.26 1.84 0.16 3.19 2.32 4.15 26 
Overall  average 1.16 3.51 2.75 2.31 0.27 3.40 2.93 5.26  
Range 0-4 1-5 1-5 1-3 0-1 1-5 1-5 0-10  
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Annex 3: Allocation of Vote Intention Parties to Party Families 
Party Family Parties 
UK  
Far left None 
Centre-Left Labour, SNP, Plaid Cymru, Greens 
Centre Liberal Democrats 
Centre-right Conservative 
Right-wing Populist UKIP 
  
France  
Far left Parti Communiste; Parti de Gauche de Jean-Luc Mélenchon 
Centre-Left Parti Socialiste 
Centre Europe Ecologie/Les Verts; Mouvement Démocrate - Modem 
Centre-right Les Républicains 
Right-wing Populist Front National 
  
Germany  
Far left Piraten 
Centre-Left SPD; Bundnis 90/Die Grunen; Die Linke 
Centre FDP 
Centre-right CDU 
Right-wing Populist AfD 
  
Sweden  
Far left Vänsterpartiet; Feministiskt Initiativ 
Centre-Left Miljöpartiet, Socialdemokraterna 
Centre Centerpartiet Liberalerna (tidigare Folkpartiet) 
Centre-right Moderaterna, Kristdemokraterna 
Right-wing Populist Sverigedemokraterna 
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Denmark  
Far left Radikale Venstre; Venstre 
Centre-Left Socialdemokraterne; Socialistisk Folkeparti 
Centre Liberal Alliance 
Centre-right Det Konservative Folkeparti Kristendemokraterne, 
Right-wing Populist Dansk Folkeparti 
  
Finland  
Far left Piraattipuolue; Soumen Kommunistinen Puolue; Vasemmistoliitto 
Centre-Left Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue; Vihreä liitto; Suomen Ruotsalainen 
Kansanpuolue 
Centre Keskusta 
Centre-right Kokoomus; Kristillisdemokraatit 
Right-wing Populist Perussuomalaiset 
  
Poland  
Far left None 
Centre-Left Zjednoczona Lewica 
Centre Nowoczesna 
Centre-right Prawo i Sprawiedliwo; Platforma Obywatelska; Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 
Right-wing Populist Kukiz'15 
  
Italy  
Far left Sinistra Italiana 
Centre-Left Partito Democratico 
Centre Movimento Cinque Stelle 
Centre-right Forza Italia;  Fratelli d’Italia 
Right-wing Populist Lega Nord;  
  
Spain  
Far left Unidos Podemos 
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Centre-Left Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
Centre Ciudadanos-Partido de la Ciudadanía 
Centre-right Partido Popular 
Right-wing Populist None 
  
Holland  
Far left SP 
Centre-Left PvdA 
Centre D66 
Centre-right VVD, CDA 
Right-wing Populist PVV 
 
 
  
38 
 
 
Annex 4: Relationship between Party Family and Authoritarian Populist Status, by Country 
 
Table A4.1: UK 
 AP tribe status 
 Not in an AP  
Tribe 
Member of 
Left AP tribe 
Member of 
Right AP tribe 
Party Family    
Far Left 0 0 0 
Centre Left 61 43 8 
Centre 12 5 2 
Centre Right 26 27 67 
Right Wing Populist 1 25 24 
Column percentages reported; data weighted by internal country weights 
Table A4.2: France 
 AP tribe status 
 Not in an AP  
Tribe 
Member of 
Right AP tribe 
Party Family   
Far Left 40 3 
Centre Left 37 12 
Centre 11 16 
Centre Right 2 39 
Right Wing Populist 10 30 
Column percentages reported; data weighted by internal country weights 
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Table A4.3: Germany 
 AP tribe status 
 Not in an AP  
Tribe 
Member of 
Right AP tribe 
Party Family   
Far Left 3 0 
Centre Left 58 16 
Centre 5 4 
Centre Right 28 17 
Right Wing Populist 7 63 
Column percentages reported; data weighted by internal country weights 
Table A4.4: Sweden 
 AP tribe status 
 Not in an AP  
Tribe 
Member of 
Right AP tribe 
Party Family   
Far Left 19 1 
Centre Left 39 11 
Centre 13 6 
Centre Right 26 30 
Right Wing Populist 4 52 
Column percentages reported; data weighted by internal country weights 
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Table A4.5: Denmark 
 AP tribe status 
 Not in an AP  
Tribe 
Member of 
Right AP tribe 
Party Family   
Far Left 14 2 
Centre Left 65 14 
Centre 3 14 
Centre Right 10 41 
Right Wing Populist 8 29 
Column percentages reported; data weighted by internal country weights 
 
Table A4.6: Finland 
 AP tribe status 
 Not in an AP  
Tribe 
Member of 
Left AP tribe 
Member of 
Right AP tribe 
Party Family    
Far Left 13 40 7 
Centre Left 42 48 23 
Centre 12 8 24 
Centre Right 29 1 23 
Right Wing Populist 4 3 23 
Column percentages reported; data weighted by internal country weights 
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Table A4.7: Poland 
 AP tribe status 
 Not in an AP  
Tribe 
Member of 
Left AP tribe 
Member of 
Right AP tribe 
Party Family    
Far Left 0 0 0 
Centre Left 14 3 0 
Centre 27 20 2 
Centre Right 50 54 91 
Right Wing Populist 9 23 7 
Column percentages reported; data weighted by internal country weights 
 
Table A4.8: Italy 
 AP tribe status 
 Not in an AP  
Tribe 
Member of 
Left AP tribe 
Member of 
Right AP tribe 
Party Family    
Far Left 12 6 4 
Centre Left 32 3 26 
Centre 41 25 45 
Centre Right 12 40 17 
Right Wing Populist 3 26 8 
Column percentages reported; data weighted by internal country weights 
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Table A4.9: Spain 
 AP tribe status 
 Not in an AP  
Tribe 
Member of 
Right AP tribe 
Party Family   
Far Left 14 46 
Centre Left 20 51 
Centre 19 1 
Centre Right 47 1 
Right Wing Populist 0 0 
Column percentages reported; data weighted by internal country weights 
 
Table A4.8: Holland 
 AP tribe status 
 Not in an AP  
Tribe 
Member of 
Left AP tribe 
Member of 
Right AP tribe 
Party Family    
Far Left 18 16 8 
Centre Left 21 15 5 
Centre 15 7 9 
Centre Right 35 24 28 
Right Wing Populist 11 38 50 
Column percentages reported; data weighted by internal country weights 
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Annex 5: Pooled Ordered Logit Model of Party-Family Vote Intention in Ten European Countries 
 Coefficient Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Probability 
Age .00 .00 .27 
Male/not .20 .11 .06 
Education .05 .05 .34 
Authoritarian Populist/not 1.01 .38 .01 
‘Not Home around here’ scale .49 .06 .00 
Annual average GDP change 2006-15 .46 .45 .07 
Percent Population foreign born 2015 .01 .04 .80 
Cut 1 .32 .49  
Cut 2 2.19 .49  
Cut 3 2.92 .45  
Cut 4 4.61 .45  
Pseudo R2 .09   
N 6466   
Dependent variable is a 5-category ordered measure: 1=Far left; 2=Centre-left; 3=Centre;  
4=Centre-right; 5=Right-wing Populist 
Ordered logit with robust standard errors adjusted for 10 (country) clusters 
 
 
 
 
